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ABSTRACT:
This thesis critiques white liberal subjectivity, primarily through the work of
Claudia Rankine. In Rankine’s The White Card, she critiques white liberal
subjectivity through the form of a play, a space of encounter. In the case of The
White Card, the play’s primary encounter appears to be about white people
encountering Black people, but in actuality the encounter resides in white people
encountering their own white liberal subjectivity. In order to further conceive of
how white liberal subjectivity functions, I draw from Gloria Wekker’s “white
innocence” and Sara Ahmed’s “affective economies” to craft the lens of an affective
economy of white innocence. An affective economy of white innocence
demonstrates how affects both comprise collectivities, such as the white liberal
subjectivity, as well as stratify collectivities from one another. In addition to Wekker
and Ahmed, I place Rankine’s critique of white liberal subjectivity in dialogue with
the works of thinkers such as Hortense Spillers, Franz Fanon, Sara Ahmed, and
Saidiya Hartman. While the affect of guilt structures much of the white liberal
subjectivity, I also consider how the affect of shame, as understood by George Yancy
and James Cone, may access an otherwise to the white liberal subjectivity. Through
these dialogues, I encounter the harms of white liberal subjectivities as well as an
otherwise to white liberal subjectivities.

A “Wokeness” that Never Was: The Affective Economy of White Innocence and the
Possibilities of Shame

by
Hannah Murray
B.A., Indiana University, 2016

Thesis
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in Religion

Syracuse University
May 2020

Copyright © Hannah Murray, 2020
All rights reserved. No part of this thesis may be reproduced or used in any manner
without written permission of the copyright owner except for the use of quotations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. v
INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1
CHAPTER 1: WHITE LIBERAL SUBJECTIVITY AND WHITENESS…………………………. 10
CHAPTER 2: GUILT………………………………………………………………………………………….... 28
CHAPTER 3: SHAME………………………………………………………………………………………….. 51
WORKS CITED………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 63

iv

PREFACE
“If you are white, and you are reading this letter, I ask that you don’t run to seek shelter from your
own racism. Don’t hide from your responsibility…. After all, it is painful to let go of your ‘white
innocence,’ to use this letter as a mirror, one that refuses to show you what you want to see, one that
demands that you look at the lies that you tell yourself so that you don’t feel the weight of
responsibility for those who live under the yoke of whiteness, your whiteness.” – George Yancy, “Dear
White America: Letter to a New Minority”

It’s November 2019, and I found myself on a paper deadline when I got an
email from my friend listing all the initiatives for white allies to protest the latest
white supremacist attacks on Syracuse University’s campus, attacks that happened
to get more press than the innumerable ones before.
“Are you going to the protest?” She asked me.
I’d donated money to the protest, I’d written my thesis on how futile the
history of white antiracist efforts have continued to be, I’d shared whatever info I
could on the protest and antiracism through my media platforms, I’d faced that
paralyzing white ally fear of being called a racist after my Black and Latinx students
called me a racist dozens of times when I’d taught Malcolm X and Martin Luther
King in Chicago, I’d agreed to talk about race and accept whatever consequences
would happen because, as my first Black educator pointed out, it just matters to not
stop talking about how this country depends upon the death of Black bodies to
function.
What else do you want me to do? I thought in exasperation. Haven’t I earned
the status of white ally already?
“They need other white bodies there,” she said.
She went. I didn’t.
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Then the buzz of a possible shooter circulated, and I continued to not show
up for my own safety. The consequences and my affects of shame for not showing up
are ones I am responsible for wrestling with, but something that must be
understood about my decision to place me in better proximity to safety is that this is
not a choice Black bodies are given. This momentary proximity to trauma is one my
positionality as white has prevented me from traveling toward. As Adrienne Rich
says, “To locate myself in my body means more than understanding what it has
meant to me to have a vulva and clitoris and uterus and breasts. It means
recognizing this white skin, the places it has taken me, the places it has not let me
go.”1 The fear that consumed me at the possibility of being shot by someone —a fear
of absolute, atmospheric terror that left me in a state of paranoid distrust where
suddenly every person on campus had a gun in their backpack that could be aimed
at me—is the exception rather than the norm for my life. Not for Black life. As
Christina Sharpe argues in In the Wake, Black life is one that is shaped by “immanent
and imminent death.”2 “Ms. Murray, did you ever have to worry about getting shot
when you were walking home from school?” One of my Black students asked me
after school back in 2016. He was curious, not accusatory. I’d said “no” then. For
Black life, this is the everyday: police officer shootings, gang shootings, white
supremacist harassment, and even the rapid-fire bullet point wounds from the daily
micro aggressions by well-to-do white allies as Audre Lorde outlines in “The Uses of

Adrienne Rich. “Notes Toward the Politics of Location.” Feminist Theory Reader: Local and Global
Perspectives Fourth Edition, edited by Carole R. McCann and Seung-Kyung Kim, Routledge, 2017, 177.
2 Christina Sharpe. In the Wake: On Blackness and Being, (Durham, Duke University Press, 2016) 13.
1
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Anger.”3 This is where we must start if we are to do any form of pragmatic action in
this system that thrives on Black death.
White failure is both yours and mine, white allies. Accept it as unremitting. I
don’t care if you say you have friends or partners or neighbors or coworkers who
are Black or you are somehow in love with Michelle Obama or you follow Rachel
Cargle or Layla Said who tell you how you suck as a white woman or you went to a
Black Lives Matter protest or you donate to Black causes or you memorized Audre
Lorde. Black people do not owe you their validation of you as being one of the cool
white people; believe me, I’ve tried to get it. Stop trying to claim or earn your
innocence from racism. We never were innocent. Let’s begin there.

3

Audre Lorde, The Uses of Anger, (Women's Studies Quarterly, vol. 25, no. ½, 1997) 278-280.
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INTRODUCTION
“What can I do for you? How can I help you?” (vii). A white man posed these
two questions to Black woman poet, Claudia Rankine, after a reading of her novellength poem on everyday racism, Citizen.4 Rankine prefaces her play, The White
Card, with her exchange with this man, a white audience member who stands for the
familiar trope of a do-good liberal whiteness that assumes a knowledge, power, and
capability already achieved to help or even save victimized Black bodies.5 Drilling
down on this assumption of achieved ability, Rankine refers to such sentimental
gestures as the “often-meaningless reparative largesse of whiteness in the face of
human pain and suffering” (viii). Such a sentimental gesture is meaningless because
it serves to only further displace the white man’s feelings of guilt around his
complicity into a plane of agency: if only he can do something for the oppressed
Blacks, then he can avoid considering or accepting his own complicity. In response
to this familiar deflection of white guilt, Rankine replies: “I think the question you
should be asking is what you can do for you” (viii). He receives her response with
anger and defensiveness, feelings connected, as I will argue in Chapter 1, with what
Gloria Wekker terms an affective economy of “white innocence.” 6
My project will not be revolving around questions of how white liberal
subjectivity and agency, which thinks itself both innocent and capable, can save
Black people in the U.S. Those positioned as white liberal subjects, such as the white

Claudia Rankine, Citizen: An American Lyric, (Minneapolis, Graywolf Press, 2014).
Claudia Rankine, The White Card, (Minneapolis, Graywolf Press, 2019).
6 Gloria Wekker, White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race, (Durham, Duke University
Press, 2016).
4
5
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man at Rankine’s reading, do not have the capacity or ability to even answer these
questions. As I will argue in more detail, white liberal subjects who prescribe to a
“white innocence” in the U.S. ordain the capacities of whiteness, operating as a kind
of “religion of whiteness.” Instead, my project revolves around questions stimulated
by Rankine’s preface and explored through the entirety of The White Card:
1. How does the refusal of “white innocence” produce white death, in the vein
of James Cone’s Black theology and George Yancy’s “tarrying,” for realistic
action in opposition to socially structured and affectively disseminated
racism?
2. What affects have white liberal subjects in the U.S. owned or disowned
through an allegiance to what Gloria Wekker terms (in a different context)
“white innocence”?
My thesis will critique what I term an “affective economy of white innocence” by (1)
grounding myself in definitions for the establishment of my analytical lens, (2)
closely reading parts of Rankine’s play for its deployment of the affective economy
of white innocence (e.g., Sara Ahmed, Franz Fanon, Saidiya Hartman, and Hortense
Spillers), and finally (3) drawing on James Cone’s Black theology and George Yancy’s
white shame to consider post-white innocence possibilities, including unremitting
white failure.

Chapter Outline
The first chapter of my thesis will distinguish and clarify the terms I will be
using in order to produce a coherent lens of analysis through which to understand
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and engage with whiteness. In the first section of the chapter, I consider the
research question, “What affects have white liberal subjects in the U.S. owned or
disowned through an allegiance to what Gloria Wekker terms (in a different
context) ‘white innocence’?” I consider affects that comprise a white liberal subject.
Then I consider how a critique of whiteness, and specifically white liberal subjects,
may be a generative research methodology. In this consideration, I draw from
Wiegman’s definition of critique as a desire that motivates research. I also evaluate
Wiegman’s genealogy of Whiteness Studies to consider how previous critiques of
whiteness fall short. Many of these critiques of whiteness fall short due to a desire to
manifest a critical agency integral to white liberal subjectivity. I consider the
question, “How does white liberal subjectivity commit violences upon Black
bodies?” through drawing upon the circulation and accumulation of affects that
white liberal subjectivity operates within. In order to organize more specifically
how violence, white liberal subjectivity, and affect interrelate, I draw from Gloria
Wekker’s account of Dutch “white innocence” and Sara Ahmed’s “affective
economies” to develop an affective economy of white innocence.
In the second section of Chapter 1, I distinguish whiteness from white liberal
subjectivity in addition to addressing the other research question I have posed:
“How does the refusal of ‘white innocence’ produce white death, in the vein of James
Cone’s Black theology and George Yancy’s ‘tarrying,’ for realistic action in opposition
to socially structured and affectively disseminated racism?” I begin by considering
Sara Ahmed’s request to attend to the “stuckness” of whiteness as a dominant
backdrop. I draw on Ahmed’s “stuckness” as a means to reorient how to approach
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whiteness, specifically a white liberal subjectivity, as an object of study. Such
“stuckness” can deemphasize a desire for the triumph of a white liberal subjectivity
to single-handedly abolish a racist system. I ground my research in the “stuckness”
of white failure. This “stuck” white failure resides in the inability to enact
reparations for the racist legacy of the U.S. nation-state. However, the solution to
white failure is not triumph, but, paradoxically, acceptance of such unremitting
white failure. I draw from Eddie Glaude’s tragic pragmatism to consider how failure
remains inevitable when accounting for the pervasively tragic social context of the
U.S. I also turn to Black philosophical and theological thinkers like George Yancy and
James Cone to consider how Yancy’s “tarrying” in shame and James Cone’s “white
death” can serve as an intervention to consider an otherwise outside the affective
economy of white innocence.
In Chapters 2 and 3, I will analyze elements in Rankine’s The White Card
through the two research questions I have posed. I select Rankine’s play as a
generative site for archetypal portrayals of “white innocence” in the U.S. Let me
briefly summarize the plot. Rankine’s The White Card, set in contemporary
Manhattan, begins with a dinner party hosted by an affluent white couple, Charles
and Virginia, who invite a Black artist, Charlotte, over in the hopes of purchasing
some of her art. A conversation about race, representation, politics, and visibility
unfolds, further amplified by the entrance of Charles and Virginia’s activist son, Alex.
The play ends in Charlotte’s studio where Charles attempts to make amends.
Instead, Charles finds himself encountering other affects of rage, defensiveness, and,
ultimately, shame upon discovering that Charlotte has displayed him, particularly
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images of his skin, in her recent pieces on white complicity. In Rankine’s two-act
play, a variety of white archetypes perpetuate their own form of blind racism in
their allegiance to “white innocence.”7 Rankine illuminates in the play how white
characters avoid or disavow the affect of shame through their attempts at “helping”
Blacks.
I preface my later engagement with Rankine’s piece by addressing how an
academic analysis of The White Card poses potential dangers of “minoritizing”
Rankine’s thoughts. This “minoritization” might happen in two ways: (1) repeating
the violence of minimizing Black work as an object of analysis in an academic setting
and (2) usurping a local critique of whiteness through the use of transnational
thinkers such as Wekker or Ahmed who critique whiteness outside of a U.S. context.
To address the first concern, I consider how I engage with Rankine’s work as not an
analysis of an object, but a dialogue with an enfleshed text. I see this dialogue
process between Rankine and theorists as similar to the dialogue in plays. I try to
enact a play in my thesis as Rankine defines theatre: “a space for and of encounter”
(ix). The text engages with me as much as I engage with it. An attempt at close
reading such a play places Rankine’s work and materiality prior to analysis. In other
words, Rankine’s material illuminates and theorizes in its own right just as much as
the other institutional philosophers and critical theorists that I place in conversation
with her. In addressing the second concern of transnational usurpation, I consider
the universality of Blackness. Although Rankine’s work may be grounded in Black

Rankine engages in a literary tradition of a similar vein as Invisible Man, Native Son, and A Raisin the
Sun where other forms of “white innocence” as it’s manifested in white Marxists or white patronage
reproduce the very hierarchal difference they seek to eradicate.
7
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critical theory as lived and experienced by Black bodies in the U.S., this does not
necessitate that Rankine’s work be solely applicable to localized Black bodies or
Black experience in the U.S. Rankine’s work evokes a Blackness in its critique of
whiteness that may in part influence, juxtapose, or add to transnational critiques of
whiteness. To minoritize Blackness may actually be to limit Blackness’s knowledges,
truths, scope, and applicability to solely Black bodies. All disciplines and
epistemologies can benefit from Blackness. I draw this concept of Blackness from
Fred Moten vis-à-vis Hortense Spillers. Moten considers Blackness as a nothingness
that explodes notions of identity tethered to a subject. 8 This nothingness stems from
Spillers’s notion of Black flesh as the “zero degree of social conceptualization” that
extends beyond the European hegemonic production of Black bodies. 9 Through this
reading of Blackness, I argue that the “nothingness” of Blackness is the very reason
for its universal applicability to other academic disciplines such as, in this case,
transnational critiques of whiteness.
The second chapter of my thesis will engage with Rankine’s play to explore
how white characters have avoided the affect shame through two divergent
modalities of white liberal subjectivity: white saviordom and “wokeness.” I will
begin by examining the archetypal white saviordom of Charles and Virginia, who
actually perform a harmful white innocence. Charles and Virginia collect art from
Black artists in their “entrepreneurial” effort toward racial reparations. As Rankine
illuminates throughout the first act of the play, Charles and Virginia’s self-

Fred Moten, “Blackness and Nothingness (Mysticism in the Flesh)” (Southern Atlantic Quarterly, vol.
112, no. 4, 2013) 737–780.
9 Hortense Spillers “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe” (Diacritics, vol. 17, no. 2, 1987) 64-81.
8
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proclaimed position, as exemplars of “white innocence” in juxtaposition to Trump
supporters, justifies their defensiveness over disavowed affects. By attending to the
affective dynamics of disavowal in these white characters, I will demonstrate how
their affects function to cover up four specific racist dispositions: (a) what Hortense
Spillers terms “pornotroping” of Black bodies, (b) what Franz Fanon maps out as an
analytic of non-recognition, (c) the fallacies of diversity and inclusion, and (d) the
violence of relating. Both Virginia and Charles’s capital investment in Black art
maintains affective disavowal by their commodification of Black bodies, an
economic commodification that also objectifies Black death. Charles and Virginia’s
attempts to garner empathy for Black bodies from a white voyeur embodies the
affective economy of white saviordom. Such an affective economy only further
distorts and objectifies Black bodies through memorialization of Black death. Affects
such as empathy, as Saidiya Hartman references particularly on the part of white
abolitionists during slavery, still function as an erasure of Black flesh in order to
construct a Black (non)-subject as a projection of white subjectivity.10 I aim to
critique the pervasive hold of empathy over white saviordom so that more
constructive non-disavowing affects such as shame may circulate through and onto
white subjects instead.
Turning from Charles and Virginia’s white saviordom, Chapter 2 also draws
on Hartman to analyze Alex’s “wokeness.” The son’s supposed “wokeness” is yet
another defense mechanism, another form of white innocence, that functions in a

Saidiya Hartman, Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century
America. (New York, Oxford University Press, 1997).
10
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similar vein as his parents’ white saviordom. Alex is introduced or presented as
someone who protests for marginalized groups such as Black Lives Matter.
Throughout Alex’s appearance in the play, he dismisses both his mother and father’s
ignorance and white fragility, maintaining a stance of enlightened white anti-racist
subjectivity. However, the play reveals how Alex co-opts the affects of movements
such as Black Lives Matter to justify his own personal rage toward his family. In
other words, as Rankine hints at in her preface, Alex exemplifies how to avoid doing
what he can for himself or to further reckon with his own whiteness. Alex’s attempt
at a woke allyship prevents him from accepting his implication in Black death.
Hartman highlights the ways in which historically white attempts at constructing a
Black subject—on the part of slave-owners and abolitionists—remain only a
projection of whiteness for further self-making. Alex’s attendance at Black Lives
Matter remains voyeuristic, I will argue, and the affective economy of his rage
remains tethered not to the violation and torture as a condition of Black
embodiment but rather his own desire for separation from his white savior parents.
Black activism functions as a realm in which Alex may co-opt for further separation
from his parents, a separation that he conflates with a separation from whiteness.
The third chapter will assess how the shedding of white innocence provides
access to constructive affects of shame. Such access points to a sacred potentiality of
vulnerability as outlined by James Cone. The second act of The White Card calls for
white subjects to look at their whiteness—that elusive yet pervasive, allencompassing yet unacknowledged position—through accessing affects of shame
and self-disgust. This access to shame cannot come from what Hortense Spillers
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terms “pornotroping” the Black body or “saving” the Black body (moves I will take
up in Chapter 2), but instead must emerge from the impossibility to embody “white
innocence” on a historical, positional, and affective scale. This chapter will consider
realistic potentialities for action after acceptance of such subject impossibility. I
draw from Black critical theory’s consideration for the potentialities of Blackness
after an acceptance of the impossibility of subjectivity in the U.S. to apply to the
potentialities for realistic action on the part of white subjects after their acceptance
of the impossibility of white innocence as a subjectivity. As Rankine’s Black female
protagonist, Charlotte, concludes in a conversation with Charles, “Go further into
that hopelessness, and then we can begin to really see each other” (87). What does
this hopelessness demand? How might this produce a “death to whiteness” as James
Cone articulates? What sacred possibilities may unfold through “go[ing] further”?
Can there be a post-“white innocence” and what might that look like? These
questions I intend to consider further as I unpack my thesis.
In order to begin a critique of white liberal subjectivity, I will first establish
my analytical lens of whiteness to define a white liberal subjectivity historically and
affectively. Chapter 1 lays the groundwork for what we will consider the white
liberal subjectivity as well as possibilities outside a white liberal subjectivity.
Chapter 2 dialogues between my analytical lens and Rankine’s The White Card in
order to generate a current critique of the white liberal subjectivity as it fits within
an affective economy of white innocence.
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CHAPTER 1: WHITENESS AND WHITE LIBERAL SUBJECTIVITY
I begin this chapter by returning to the two core questions which motivate
this project:
1. What affects have white liberal subjects in the U.S. owned or disowned
through an allegiance to what Gloria Wekker terms [in a different context]
“white innocence”?
2. How does the refusal of “white innocence” produce an otherwise, in the vein
of George Yancy’s shame and James Cone’s Black theology, for realistic action
in opposition to socially structured and affectively disseminated racism?
My first section will consider the first question on white liberal subjects. I will (1)
consider affects that imply a white liberal subject, (2) apply Wiegman’s definitions
of critique and Whiteness Studies to situate my own critique of whiteness, (3) delve
into how these affects comprise Gloria Wekker’s “white innocence”, and (4) develop
the theory of an affective economy of white innocence.
In my second section, I will attend to whiteness in addition to the second
question’s focus on a “refusal” of white innocence. I will (1) draw from Ahmed’s
whiteness as background to (2) consider how whiteness manifests in religious
aesthetics in order to (3) illuminate the global pervasiveness of whiteness as well as
(4) how a tragic pragmatism and Black theology may serve as an otherwise to
whiteness’s power as specifically manifested in the affective economy of white
innocence.

11
White Liberal Subjectivity: Affects Owned and Disowned
Consider disavowal. A denial cloaked in veils of defensiveness. Consider
innocence. A maintenance of ethereal purity untouched by responsibility. Consider
triumphant agency. A victory of choosing correctly. Consider guilt. A nagging feeling
of agential failure, which future actions may redress. Each of these affects—
disavowal, innocence, triumphant agency, and guilt—imply an active subject who
experiences them. This subject moves within an atmosphere of responsibility,
responsibilities individually allotted or declined. I consider this particular subject,
and its subsequent affects, the white liberal subjectivity.
This first question, (“What affects have white liberal subjects in the U.S.
owned or disowned through an allegiance to what Gloria Wekker terms [in a
different context] ‘white innocence’?”), stems from a critique of a white liberal
subjectivity and its supposed agential capacities. Through focusing my project on
whiteness, a concern may arise as to whether my project contributes to the ongoing
centering and privileging of whiteness in academic study. However, I situate my
focus on whiteness through the methodology of critique. When considering how
critique operates, I draw from Robyn Wiegman’s definition of critique. In Object
Relations, Robyn Wiegman asserts that the question of critique is a question of
desire.11 Specific desires, such as social justice, underpin academic critique.
Wiegman’s agenda does not include denying desire or crafting another desire, but
instead examines how our desires shape what we critique. In my desire for a racial
justice that demands an acceptance of unremitting failure on the part of white allies,
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Robyn Wiegman, Object Relations, (Durham, Duke University Press, 2012).
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I critique the white liberal subjectivity. Though my critique indeed focuses on
whiteness as an object of study, my orientation toward such object of study is a
desire for its death. By “death,” I mean the death of the white liberal subjectivity’s
supposed agential capacities in the project of racial justice. I desire this death
because, as I will articulate throughout my thesis, the white liberal subjectivity in
fact contributes to racial oppression in the U.S.
I draw on Wiegman’s Object Relations to consider not only her definition of
critique but also her genealogy of Whiteness Studies. I consider how previous
academic critiques of whiteness, as outlined by Wiegman, problematically reify the
white liberal subjectivity rather than dismantle it. Wiegman examines how our
desires shape not only what we critique but also the way we organize disciplinary
fields through specific critiques. She writes:
My purpose is not to expose or condemn the desire we invest in objects and
analytics, but to pay attention to that desire, to the way it shapes the field’s
disciplinary form and generates both its and our critical capacities in order to
learn something about the conundrum that accompanies a disciplinary
apparatus that promises to make critical practice an agency for doing justice
(89).
This type of desire for social justice influences how a scholar conducts a critique, the
object of study, and what counts as an object of study. Through her examination of
various identity-oriented departments, such as Ethnic Studies, Women’s and Gender
Studies, and Whiteness Studies, Wiegman highlights how the founding of these
departments is rooted in particular desires for social justice. However, as indicated
in the quote above, the issue with these identity-oriented departments is that they
placed critical practice and social justice outcomes in the realm of an agential
capacity. In other words, the desires of these identity-oriented department critiques
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were rooted in assumptions about subjectivity. Subjects could both achieve social
justice and attain a status of anti-racist. In the case of the Whiteness Studies of the
90s, such an identity study desired a woke or “anti-racist subject,” which
underpinned their critiques of whiteness. Rather than undermine the harms of a
white liberal subjectivity, Whiteness Studies recapitulated them. Such critiques
redirected white guilt into a plane of agency: Whiteness Studies desired “critical
agency” where critical practices could “undo multiple effects of dominant identity
formations by projecting an increasingly empowered self-knowing subject” (140).
This “increasingly empowered self-knowing subject” is known as the “anti-racist
subject.” The issue of such a desire rests in an emphasis on how white liberal
subjects can become successful at achieving an enlightened anti-racist subjectivity
as the solution to affectively structured and disseminated racism. I bring Wiegman’s
genealogy of Whiteness Studies into the conversation to illuminate how desires
tethered to subjectivity cannot successfully contribute to racial justice. Whereas
these dated critiques of whiteness desire a critical agency or “woke” antiracist
subjectivity, my critique maintains a desire to dismantle the current pervasive hold
and power of the white liberal subjectivity.
Rather than focusing on the triumph of a white anti-racist subjectivity, I
ground my project in white failure, particularly unremitting white failure to propose
or enact reparations for the U.S. legacy of slavery, as a foundation for attending to a
critique of anti-racist subjectivity. I desire a kind of social justice that grounds itself
in a realistic, mistake-laden action that accepts failure as unremitting through
critiquing white innocence. A belief in an anti-racist white liberal subjectivity stunts

14
a pragmatic possibility such as this.12 Thus, my own thesis project will be grounded
in a critique of a white liberal subject who operates in an affective economy of white
innocence. (This critique will ultimately entail the death of anti-racist white liberal
subjectivities, which will be further detailed in Chapter 3 when exploring the uses of
the affect of shame.) Following Wiegman’s charge to track the desires belied by our
objects of research, I will put pressure on the desire of an anti-racist subjectivity. I
will also track my own desire in making this subject the object of my thesis: a desire
to cut through the disavowals of “white innocence.” The approach of my thesis alters
how whiteness is critiqued. Rather than critiquing how white subjects self-identify
as racist, I will critique white subjects who self-identify as the anti-racist subject.
How does one go about a critique of white liberal subjectivity in the attempt
at dismantling its power? I return to the affects we encountered at the beginning of
this section: disavowal, innocence, triumphant agency, and guilt. Such affects
manifest in both the structuring and operation of the white liberal subjectivity.
Therefore, we must further interrogate how they interrelate and progress upon one
another. I consider Gloria Wekker’s own focus on the affect of “innocence” as it
applies to a positionality she names “white innocence.” Wekker conducts an
anthropological assessment of the Dutch treatment of race in White Innocence:
Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race. Through analyzing situated knowledges from
Wekker’s own upbringing, her own work for the Dutch government, and her
exposure to Dutch popular and academic culture, Wekker unveils the ways in which

I will further ascertain how this pragmatism will unfold in Chapter 3 with the guidance of Eddie S.
Glaude Jr.’s pragmatism in In a Shade of Blue: Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America.
12
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“white innocence” as an integral component of the Dutch self is utilized. The white
Dutch population utilizes this “white innocence” to prevent critical engagement with
white complicity in racism. In her explanation of “white innocence,” Wekker
elaborates on the kind of rhetoric used by the Dutch nation:
“We are a small nation, innocent; we are inherently antiracist; we do not
have bad intentions” is shorthand to sum up this white sense of self. These
defense mechanisms serve to preserve this ideal image of ourselves as
deeply colorblind and antiracist. Questioning this most dearly held core of
the Dutch sense of self means putting oneself above “us”; it also runs deeply
counter to another strand in the Dutch sense of self, egalitarianism (79).
I will be using Wekker’s account and critique of Dutch “white innocence” as a critical
lens for examining American sensibilities. “White innocence” functions as a
positionality that denies any complicity in systematic racism in its purportedly
egalitarian colorblindness and the fact that “we do not have bad intentions” (79). In
particular, while recognizing that the U.S. is not the Netherlands, I want to borrow
her concept of “white innocence” to craft an American account of the shortcomings
of whiteness. Both the U.S. and the Netherlands share an emphasis on considering
racism a matter pertaining to the individual subject. The dilemma of situating
racism in a realm of intentionality, in a similar vein as Wiegman’s critique of
Whiteness Studies’ “critical agency” is that racism can be simply boiled down to
individual choices. Again, as in Rankine’s preface to The White Card, the flaw in
maintaining racism as a solely individual and intentional endeavor is that it denies a
focus on individualities complicit in larger affective systems. Racism does not simply
germinate in an individual subject. Because it does not simply start in the subject it
cannot also simply end in the subject. Rather, the affects that manifest as racist acts
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in the world circulate and grow in histories and value, or, as Sarah Ahmed considers
as “affective economies”.13
I draw on Sara Ahmed’s definition of “affective economy” to consider how the
circulation and accumulation of certain affects inflict harms onto certain collective
bodies. An affective economy, as Ahmed articulates in “The Organisation of Hate,” is
the circulation of affects “between signifiers in relationships of difference and
displacement” (44). Contrary to psychoanalytic theory, affects do not originate from
a subject’s interiority but can stick to subjects externally as a nodal point in the
economy. Likewise, affect does not reside in a single object or sign, but instead affect
“is an effect of the circulation between objects and signs (the accumulation of
affective value)” (45). Signs increase in their “affective value” as an effect of how
frequently affects flow between them. Ahmed notes, “The fact that some signs are
repeated is precisely not because the signs themselves contain hate, but because
they are effects of histories that have stayed open” (65). Ahmed’s “The Organisation
of Hate” addresses how the affective economies of hate construct the contours of the
Black body and Black people as well as the white body and white nation. Ahmed
argues:
In this way, hate creates the surfaces of bodies through the way in which
bodies are aligned with and against other bodies. How we feel about others is
what aligns us with a collective, which paradoxically 'takes shape' only as an
effect of such alignments. It is through how others impress upon us that the
skin of the collective begins to take shape (54).

Sara Ahmed, “Organisation of Hate,” The Cultural Politics of Emotion (Edinburgh, Edinburgh
University Press, 2004) 42-61.
13

17
While Ahmed focuses on how affective economies of white hate create the
collectivities of Black people and white supremacists, I maintain that the affective
economy of white innocence create collectivities of Black people and white saviors.
In both affective economies, harmful discourses are written onto Black bodies.
Affective economies aid in the critique of individualism due to how affect is
circulating and non-individual. Though individuals may perpetrate violences, these
violences result from the individual partaking in the histories accrued from affective
economies.
In “The Organisation of Hate,” Ahmed specifically focuses on how affective
economies of hate can explain the manifestations of many racist behaviors in the
U.S. I replace an affective economy of hate with an affective economy of guilt, which
serves as the apparatus for the manifestation and accumulation of white innocence
in the U.S. Ahmed traces how the circulation of hate can lead to a distinction
between collectivities, an ongoing discourse of “waiting,” and undeclared histories.
It is my argument that guilt functions similarly to produce the opposing
collectivities of “broken Black bodies” and “white innocence.”
As addressed earlier, affects in affective economies accumulate value in their
circulation. In this way, affects do not begin and end in a subject, but rather serve as
the medium for constructing bodies and figures. When speaking specifically about
how the affect of “hate” operates, Ahmed argues, “Within the narrative, hate cannot
be found in one figure, but works to create the outline of different figures or objects
of hate, a creation that crucially aligns the figures together, and constitutes them as
a ‘common threat’” (44). In the case of the affective economy of white innocence,
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guilt circulates and crafts Black bodies as the object of guilt. In this way, Black
bodies are still viewed as a common threat to white innocence due to the bodies’
presence as evidence of ongoing Black oppression in a white nation. The presence of
blackness triggers ‘guilt’ in white subjects, who feel this guilt as unpleasant and
work affectively (and in other ways) to disavow it or otherwise push it away.
Due to how affects circulate between objects, certain signifiers may accrue
more value over time irrespective of a connection to any particular body. Ahmed
writes, “So the figure of the bogus asylum seeker is detached from particular bodies:
any incoming bodies could be bogus, such that their ‘endless’ arrival is anticipated
as the scene of ‘our injury’” (47). In the case of white innocence, the circulation of an
image of the broken Black body is detached from any particular Black person: any
incoming Black person could be a broken Black body such that their endless arrival
is anticipated at the scene of white guilt. White guilt accumulates the more Blacks
are encountered as evidence of a social structure that oppresses Black people. Thus,
the broken Black body functions as the object for validation from white guilt.
For example, in The White Card, Charles’s collection of art that depicts broken
Black bodies provides a continual affective reprieve from his own guilt. He believes
he is “helping” rather than recapitulating Black oppression with his art collection.
He tells Charlotte that “if he collects [her] dead, they’ll never have to be buried” (55).
However, as Charlotte points out in the second act, collecting art that reifies Black
people as “black victims” actually contributes to rather than assuages Black
oppression (78). Charles’ collection of Black death provides yet another way to
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avoid confronting affects other than guilt, which will be considered more in Chapter
3.
This repeated need to validate one’s self due to pervasive guilt constructs a
form of waiting that coincides with Ahmed’s outlining of “waiting for the bogus” in
the case of an affective economy of hate. She maintains:
The impossibility of reducing hate to a particular body allows hate to
circulate in an economic sense, working to differentiate some others from
other others, a differentiation that is never ‘over’, as it awaits others who
have not yet arrived. Such a discourse of ‘waiting for the bogus’ is what
justifies the repetition of violence against the bodies of others in the name of
protecting the nation (47).
The impetus to “protect the nation” occurs as well in the affective economy of white
innocence. As Wekker illuminates in the Dutch account of white innocence (“we are
a small nation, innocent; we are inherently antiracist”), the swirling affect of guilt
underpins the construction of a national identity that adamantly proclaims its
innocence (79). This guilt circulates more each time Black bodies puncture white
backgrounds to prove as evidence of a nation that is in fact not innocent. In order to
maintain its differentiation as “innocent,” a discourse of “waiting for the broken”
continues to repeat as a justification for gestures of validation such as saviordom.
Those positioned in white innocence engage in such gestures, justified by guilt, to
maintain a differentiation as innocent and white from broken and Black bodies.
These gestures only serve to further cement such collectivities and further
accumulate discourses of oppression onto Black flesh. In Chapter 2, I will examine
the oppressions that circulate and accumulate in the affective economy of white
innocence as it materializes into the collectivities of white saviordom and
“wokeness” in Claudia Rankine’s The White Card.
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Whiteness’s Hold and Considering an Otherwise through a Theological Turn
Now that we have considered the white liberal subjectivity, it is worth
considering how this concept differs from whiteness. Does “whiteness” carry similar
agential capacities to white liberal subjectivity, or is it perhaps something more
atmospheric? For Ahmed, whiteness functions precisely in how it is not noticed on
the part of white positioned bodies until encountering bodies that are not white. The
encounter of non-white bodies reveals less about the non-white bodies and more
about whiteness itself as an orienting background that is an effect of affective
economies.14 On a situation where four Black women scholars entering into a
conference at the same time, Ahmed argues, “The fact that we notice such arrivals
tells us more about what is already in place than it does about ‘who’ arrives” (157).
While Ahmed maintains that some critics question her focus on whiteness as
stultifying in change, Ahmed advocates for a “phenomenology of whiteness” that
helps us to “notice institutional habits; it brings what is behind to the surface in a
certain way” (149). Ahmed argues for a focus not on what to do now but rather on
how white positioned bodies may be stuck in their whiteness. Paradoxically, the
continual focus on a “what to do now” maintains the stuckness of whiteness as
background.
Though Ahmed’s “whiteness as background” grounds itself in the
phenomenological, I argue that the phenomenological account of “whiteness as

14

Sara Ahmed “Phenomenology of Whiteness,” (Feminist Theory, vol. 8, no. 2, 2007) 149-168.
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background” can also be considered religious. Ahmed’s “whiteness as background”
in conjunction with historical representations of the divine as white in Blum and
Harvey’s The Color of Christ: The Son of God and the Saga of Race in America
functions as a pervasive yet invisible religious-like force.15 To practice the religion of
“white innocence” is to ordain white benevolence as supernatural in ability while
simultaneously denying whiteness’s implication in the very system built for it. Blum
and Harvey detail how historic depictions of Christ in abolitionist literature and art
set the tone for how whiteness became associated with “innocence” and “divine” in
the U.S. imaginary. Blum and Harvey maintain:
The growing American fascination with Jesus imagery ran directly in the
slavery debates as well. There, the embodied white Jesus became a
complicated symbol of resistance and passivity. Visions and images of Jesus
were part of the antislavery crusade (117).
Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, as illustrated by Hammatt Billings,
depicts a white, ethereal Jesus overlooking slaves and slaveowners.

Billings, Hammatt. Illustration for Uncle Tom’s Cabin. John P. Jewett & Company, 1853.
http://utc.iath.virginia.edu/interpret/exhibits/tom_leg.html.

Edward J. Blum and Paul Harvey, The Color of Christ: The Son of God and the Saga of Race in
America, (Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 2012).
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He displays his displeasure without actually doing anything about the scenario.
Blum and Harvey link such a depiction to further artistic portrayals of white
redeemers, stating, “By having Black men kneel before a white savior, Billings set
the stage for sculptors after the Civil War to place Black men beneath white
redeemers—whether in the form of Jesus, Abraham Lincoln, or Union soldiers”
(119).
I apply Ahmed’s “whiteness as background” to an American historical context
like the one above due to whiteness’s global hold. In order to consider how Ahmed’s
“whiteness as background” in addition to Wekker’s “white innocence” (from the
previous section) apply to a U.S. context, I will frame their transnational focus as a
critique of a Northern European mythos of whiteness that extends simultaneously
into a U.S. and European context. Both Nell Irvin Painter’s History of White People
and Winthrop Jordan’s White over Black trace the historical construction and
transmission of the mythos of what we now understand as “whiteness.” While
Painter traces the historical construction of the Saxony mythos across European
regions and into the U.S. imaginary, Jordan considers how English colonizing
encounters with Blackness transmit into a U.S. context.
In History of White People, Painter details how the romanticization of a Greek
past and a development of Saxonies as a superior conglomerate contributed to the
current mythos about “whiteness” across Northern Europe.16 This mythos reached a
significant culmination through German Johann Friedrich Blumenbach’s hypothesis

Nell Irvin Painter, The History of White People, (New York and London, W.W. Norton & Company,
2010).
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of human taxonomies as a widely accepted norm among European scientific
communities during the latter half of the 18 th century (75). This taxonomic theory
included justifying whiteness—then Caucasian—as scientifically superior in beauty
through the practice of measuring skulls (84). This German “renaissance” of thought
emphasized cultural regions known as Saxonies as their context for the residency of
advanced peoples. Germany mapped out three Saxonies: one in the eastern German
province, one in known as the western Lower Saxony, and one between Denmark
and Sweden (101). The mythos of Saxonies spread across Northern Europe and
remain intact as a foundation for whiteness superiority that translates from
homelands and into colonized regions as seen in the present-day Dutch landscape as
well as in the current U.S. nation-state.
In White over Black, Jordan details how English standards of “properness”
serve as a classification of man, which then Europeans would use to historically
view Black religion, appearance, and sexuality. 17 This classification, not unlike Sylvia
Wynter’s “genre of man,” produces the bestial comparison of Black bodies as being
Other from civilized man.18 In the case of Wynter, the “genre of man” remains a
Western category that socially distinguishes humans—white subjects—from nonhumans—raced Other bodies. These standards extend into both philosophical as
well as scientific discourses that craft a “transparent subjectivity” in juxtaposition to

Winthrop Jordan, White over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812, (Baltimore,
Penguin Books Inc, 1968).
18 Sylvia Wynter, “On How We Mistook the Map for the Territory, and Re-Imprisoned Ourselves In
Our Unbearable Wrongness of Being, of Désêtre: Black Studies Toward the Human Project,” in Not
Only the Master's Tools: African American Studies in Theory and Practice (Cultural Politics & the
Promise of Democracy), eds. Lewis R. Gordon and Jane Anna Gordon (Boulder and London: Paradigm
Publishers, 2005), 107-169.
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bodies that are considered more embodied or affectable as Denise Ferreira da Silva
outlines in Towards a Global Idea of Race.19 For Ferreira da Silva, a “transparent
subjectivity” or “transparent I” is a knowing subject that determines itself rather
than being determined by its exteriority or material conditions. Such a “transparent
I” maintains standards of objectivity and unaffected epistemologies. These
standards, as Painter also argues, both retain resonance in their European context
presently while also transmit into a U.S. imaginary landscape. I consider how
Jordan’s account of English encounters with Blackness serves as a crux to connect
Wekker and Ahmed’s own accounts of whiteness in a European context to a focus of
whiteness in a U.S. context.
I return to the second research question I have posed (“How does the refusal
of ‘white innocence’ produce an otherwise, in the vein of George Yancy’s shame and
James Cone’s Black theology, for realistic action in opposition to socially structured
and affectively disseminated racism?”) in order to consider an otherwise to “white
innocence.” I consider in particular the refusal of the affect known as “triumphant
agency.” One particular flaw in the desire for a white anti-racist subjectivity is the
emphasis on a promise of triumph. To focus on triumph, as manifested in the desire
for success of a white anti-racist subjectivity, is actually to recapitulate the very
systems and affective economies at play in producing Black bodies.20 This is in part
because of a refusal to encounter the world as it is now, the fact that failure is

Denise Ferreira da Silva, Toward a Global Idea of Race (Minneapolis and London: University of
Minnesota Press, 2007).
20 By Black bodies, I draw from Spillers’s definition of Black bodies in “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe:
An American Grammar Book,” as the Black flesh branded by social legacies of exploitation.
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inevitable in the process of attempting social justice, because of our investment in a
promise for the future. As Sara Ahmed notes, “It is by showing how we are stuck, by
attending to what is habitual and routine in ‘the what’ of the world, that we can keep
open the possibility of habit changes, without using that possibility to displace our
attention to the present, and without simply wishing for new tricks” (165). There
lacks a focus or gaze on the reality of tragedy in the now when fixated only on a
promise of triumph in the future. My aim is to develop a critique that may achieve a
social justice politics grounded in a kind of pragmatism.
I draw from Eddie Glaude’s pragmatic sense of tragedy to consider how a
focus on tragedy may shift our “stuck” emphasis off of the achievement of a white
anti-racist subjectivity. Glaude’s pragmatism maintains that “the problems of race in
the United States are best dealt with by confronting our past and the tragedy therein
precisely in order to invade intelligently in the future” (20). Dealing with racism
rests not in maintaining an enlightened state detached from its manifestation, but,
rather, living in the wake of the tragic legacies that carry history into the present.
When considering tragedy as the default material condition, there cannot be an
innately good choice to make. For Glaude, this intelligence about tragedy as the
default American condition matters so that Americans “never succumb to the
illusion of innocence and optimism that carries it forward” (44-45). Such
“innocence” and “optimism” construct the pervasive vehicle of “white innocence” in
the U.S.
To live in the wake of tragedy, as racism pervades and mediates through
systems and bodies, requires an acceptance that white subjects fail to ever achieve
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an anti-racist subjectivity. The shame of the past is deflected, projected, and denied
when white subjects desire “critical agency” rather than “tragic pragmatism.” By
taking seriously the material realities of the tragic as outlined by Glaude and other
Black scholars, the tragic may ground pragmatism for white subjects who still desire
justice, but one that decenters their own capacities for innocence and triumph. A
“critical agency,” as Wiegman outlines, cannot accept the inherited shame of white
positionalities. However, a “tragic pragmatism,” like Glaude articulates, demands an
acceptance of shame on the part of white subjects so that action may happen
anyway. As Glaude maintains, “Tragedy remains. We must know it and act anyway”
(20). The acceptance of such harms inflicted upon the Black body that “white
innocence” commits might generate or give rise to a praxis of realistic action that
opposes hegemonic whiteness by something like a white death. By an acceptance of
such harms of “white innocence,” there is the potentiality of pragmatic action in
opposition to the hegemonic within a white death that remains dependent upon
resisting an ideal antiracist white subject.
I have framed the chain of concepts in this chapter with the two research
questions I have posed. The first question considers the connection between the
white liberal subject and affect. The second question delves into how to consider an
otherwise outside whiteness’s persistent hold. In the first section, I identify the
affects at play in the conception of the white liberal subjectivity while also drawing
on the pitfalls and possibilities of critiquing whiteness as a research methodology.
Then I map out how affect manifests in positions like white innocence and circulates
in affective economies. Finally, I trouble the affects and agency of the white liberal
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subject with conceptualizing the theory of the affective economy of white innocence.
In the second section, I consider how whiteness functions as a pervasive effect of the
affective economy of white innocence while also turning to how a “refusal” of white
innocence may occur. I track whiteness’s culmination in religious aesthetics to the
global hold of whiteness. I also draw from tragic pragmatism as well as Black
theology to consider how a death to whiteness may open up an otherwise to white
innocence and ultimately the white liberal subject.
Ultimately, the chain of concepts as outlined in this chapter link to the
argument in my next two chapters. In Chapter 2, I will delve into what kinds of
violences are enacted onto Black bodies through the affective economy of white
innocence. I will dialogue with Claudia Rankine’s The White Card for insight into
how these violences manifest due to affects such as disavowal, innocence,
triumphant agency, and guilt that comprise the affective economy of white
innocence. In Chapter 3, I will consider an otherwise outside of the affective
economy of white innocence through the affect of shame. Ultimately, this shame
results in the death of the white liberal subject and the possibility of considering an
otherwise to the affective economy of white innocence.
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CHAPTER 2: GUILT
In The White Card, Rankine illuminates how the affects of disavowal,
innocence, triumphant agency, and guilt motivate white characters Charles, Virginia,
and Alex to commit violences against Blacks. These affects comprise the affective
economy of white innocence. Charles, Virginia, and Alex uphold and move within the
world as white liberal subjects. While Charles and Virginia’s form of white liberal
subjectivity manifests as white saviordom, Alex’s form of white liberal subjectivity
materializes as “wokeness.” As white liberal subjects, they enact attempts to “help”
Blacks, attempts that actually contribute to violences toward Blacks. Though their
violences may vary depending upon the form of white saviordom or “wokeness,”
both forms of white liberal subjectivity are motivated by capable agency and
resistance to guilt. Rankine details how their acts such as circulating violated Black
bodies online, collecting Black art, diversity and inclusion initiatives, empathy, and
allyship to Black causes function as violences white liberal subjects inflict upon
Black people under the guise of advancing Black people. I place thinkers such as
Hortense Spillers, Franz Fanon, Saidiya Hartman, and Sara Ahmed as dialogue
partners with Rankine to illuminate how the actions of Charles, Virginia, and Alex
harm Black people. Ultimately, I consider how these actions result from the affective
economy of white innocence that accumulates violences precisely in the denial of
the white liberal subject’s agential failure.
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Spillers: The Failure of Pornotroping
I begin this section by drawing out a scene from Rankine’s The White Card.
Charlotte has just detailed how her most recent art piece will depict a reenactment
of crime scenes after the Charleston shootings. She has chosen to do this, in part,
because of how the Charleston shootings of Black bodies have largely been censored
by political leaders. This censorship exemplifies the repeated erasure of Black
violation from America’s imagination of history. In this section of the text, Charlotte,
Alex, Charles, and Virginia consider how the circulation and consumption of images
depicting black death may disrupt or contribute to further violation of Black bodies:

VIRGINIA:

There really weren’t any pictures from Charleston?

CHARLOTTE:

Not of the crime scene.

VIRGINIA:

I ask Charles this all the time, why would you want to subject
an audience to these horrors? I think evidence is important,
but why do we need to see endless videos on television, on
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, every place we look…

ALEX:

Innocent people of color are every place, even if you’re trying
not to look.

CHARLES:

Actually, Virginia, it depends on how you look at it. Think back
to the death of Emmett Till in 1955. His own mother wanted
the photographs of his open casket to be shown. It energized
the civil rights movement.

ALEX

(cuts in): A fourteen-year-old black kid—murdered for
whistling at a white woman.

ERIC:

Didn’t I just read in the Times that the accuser lied about what
happened?

ALEX:

No fucking way.

VIRGINIA:

Watch the language.
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CHARLOTTE:

Are you surprised?

ERIC:

Old-age confession sort of thing…straightening out the
accounts before Judgement Day.

CHARLES:

You must think photography could have the same impact now.

CHARLOTTE:

I don’t know. It seems like our American pastimes are sports
and forgetting. We assimilate; we appropriate; we move on.

VIRGINIA:

But haven’t social media changed our general amnesia? I have
watched so many killed. I can call up their dying moments on
any device in my possession. The phrase “I can’t breathe” will
never detach itself from Freddie Garner.

ALEX:

Freddie? No, Eric Garner. Freddie Gray and Eric Garner,
already they’ve become one body for you.

Rankine, Claudia. The White Card. Minneapolis, Graywolf Press, 2019, pp. 36-7.

In this section, I will focus specifically on how Virginia’s own voyeurism to
Black suffering serves as a form of mutilation to Black bodies. The comprehension of
how white saviordom functions as a reproduction of the mutilation of Black bodies
first requires a definition of “mutilation” as well as a distinction established between
body and flesh. Mutilation is the positioning of an object as desirable by a subject. A
subject experiences self-satiation through the consumption of an object. Hortense
Spillers conceptualizes this practice of consumption of Black bodies as
“pornotroping.” Spillers argues that pornotroping arises from the colonial-slavery
context where the captor’s “externally imposed meanings and uses” situate the
captive body in “a category of ‘otherness’” (67). For Spillers, this act of constructing
social discourses is the very act of marking and transmuting Black flesh. For Spillers,
Black flesh is the “zero degree of social conceptualization” that extends beyond any
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European hegemonic discourses of exploitation. Black bodies, on the other hand, are
the amalgamation of European hegemonic discourses branded onto Black flesh.21 By
pornotroping, Spillers means the ongoing legacy of the objectification of Black flesh
into Black bodies as receptacles for the white subject’s, or in this historical context
the white captor’s, sensual excess. Simultaneously, such Black bodies, in their
rendering as an object of being, become reduced to sexualities that remain
physically and biologically othered from white subjects. This category of otherness
serves as the site for further branding of the white subject’s impulses: sensual as the
most common and sexual as the most severe. Pornotroping serves as one of many
mechanisms of oppression in rendering Black flesh into the Black body. Spillers
distinguishes Black flesh from Black body by stating that Black flesh is the “zero
degree of social conceptualization that does not escape concealment under the
brush of discourse, or the reflexes of iconography” (67). Flesh serves as the
foundation and pervasiveness of Blackness that extends beyond any material social
discourses that may brand or mark a body for the purposes of the captor.
Pornotroping directly applies to the flagrant historical and contemporary white
subjects who acknowledge themselves as captor in their literal branding, owning,
raping, and lynching of Black bodies. However, I argue that white subjects who
attempt to deny such a position as captor in favor of the term “ally” engage in their
own practice of pornotroping of Black bodies.

Hortense Spillers, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book,” (Diacritics, vol. 17,
no. 2, 1987) 64-81.
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In The White Card, both Virginia and Charles pornotrope Black bodies
through two mediums: social media and art. We see this pornotroping through
social media in the scene mentioned earlier in the chapter. When asked if Charlotte’s
art will help in changing larger political conversations around race, Charlotte
remains skeptical, noting that America’s pastimes “are sports and forgetting” (37).
Virginia challenges Charlotte, saying, “But haven’t social media changed our general
amnesia? I have watched so many killed. I can call up their dying moments on any
device in my possession. The phrase ‘I can’t breathe’ will never detach itself from
Freddie Garner” (37). The proliferation and access to Black bodies in pain through
media devices do not get white subjects any closer to seeing Black flesh, however.
Rather, as Virginia’s son, Alex, points out, Freddie Gray and Eric Garner have
collapsed into one body through the circulation and consumption of Black bodies’
splicings on footage (37). The proliferation of social media does not undo the violent
oppressions written onto Black bodies, but instead reproduces the same social
discourses of merging and blurring names. This merging and blurring of names in
turn reproduce the same collective Black body absent of subjecthood. In this case,
Virginia’s loop cycle of re-watching Black bodies dying where she merges names and
spoken words into one body merely does not differentiate her from a blatant white
racist who watches with conscious pleasure. Both operate on a plane of seeing Black
flesh as only Black body, that is as something to consume. Charlotte notes that for
Americans “we assimilate, we appropriate, we move on” (37). This process of Black
body consumption known as pornotroping relies on the “white innocence” of white
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saviors to continue circulating. As long as they view or circulate such images, they
can validate their own guilt.
In addition to pornotroping through social media, both Charles and Virginia
engage in pornotroping through collecting art that depicts Black death. At the
conclusion of the first act, Charles unveils the latest piece of art he has purchased: an
autopsy report of Michael Brown:

VIRGINIA:

It’s Michael Brown’s autopsy report!

CHARLOTTE:

(to herself) Michael Brown?

ALEX:

(quietly) I can’t even…You can’t own Michael Brown.

CHARLES:

Wait. It’s not Michael Brown.

ALEX:

It’s not? A minute ago you said you were collecting Charlotte’s
dead. “They’ll never be buried.” Remember?

CHARLES:

I mean it metaphorically. This is a representation of the
violence against Brown.

CHARLOTTE:

What do you mean it isn’t Michael Brown?

CHARLES:

Well, it’s a photograph of a diagram. That diagram documents
the violence inflicted on a black man. Isn’t that the purpose of
art—your art—to make the invisible visible?

CHARLOTTE:

Michael Brown’s body was on the street for hours. Isn’t
everything that happened to him visible? Isn’t everything that
happened to him visible? This (gestures toward the piece) is not
revealing anything we haven’t seen.

CHARLES:

For me, to see exactly where and how many bullets entered the
body of this man, who is only a year younger than Alex…was, to
say the least, upsetting.

VIRGINIA:

I have to tell you, I feel sick. The entire incident was so violent
and so unnecessary.
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CHARLOTTE:

It made you sick. It made you said. And you bought this?

VIRGINIA:

It affected us far more than all the accounts on television.

CHARLES:

This autopsy is only about one thing. It gestures toward
structural racism.

CHARLOTTE:

And what does it mean?

CHARLES:

It means the Ferguson police department was systemically
harassing and arresting black citizens in Brow’s neighborhood
for years. This piece points to Officer Wilson. If it’s a portrait of
anyone, it’s a portrait of him.

ALEX:

It’s Brown’s autopsy.

CHARLOTT:

But according to you, Charles, the only way to get to Officer
Wilson is through Michael Brown’s body?

CHARLES:

That body is a portal to the inhumanity.

CHARLOTTE:

(under her breath) We’re not going to get anywhere with this
kind of…this kind of American sentimentality.

Rankine, Claudia. The White Card. Minneapolis, Graywolf Press, 2019, pp. 56-7.

The piece is described ambiguously: a sculpture without depicting a body at
one point, a photograph of a diagram that depicts the autopsy report of Michael
Brown’s death at another time (56). This repeats the tendency of social media to
splice and reproduce the molding together of various art forms (i.e., sculpture and
photograph) with various dimensions of mediation (i.e., a sculpture of a photograph
of a diagram of an autopsy) serve to distance and erase any flesh of Michael Brown
in place of the convergence of social, historical, linguistic, and psychological realms
written about him. Earlier, when the art dealer asks to see the piece, Charles asks
that they wait until his son arrives because, “[they] had acquired it with him in
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mind” (24). Again, the patronage system is serving to satiate whiteness’s unmet
needs through the purchasing of a Black body. This example of collecting art also
demonstrates a form of pornotroping due to the monolithic white gaze splicing and
molding Black flesh into Black bodies.
When Blackness serves as an object, whiteness upholds Blackness only in
relation to what Blackness may reveal about whites. This body, according to Charles,
“is a portal to the inhumanity” for whites (57). Michael Brown serves as object,
source, and—in Charles’s words—“a portal” of sensual feeling in order to gain a
better understanding of whiteness: whiteness’s own self-identity based upon the
construction of the Black body as its oppositional object. In this way, whiteness
cannot be confronted for itself. Whiteness’s own ineptitude, own shame cannot be
examined so long as it remains the examiner, the purchaser, and the consumer
instead of the object depicted in itself.
The affect that underpins such actions of pornotroping—circulating images
of Black death on social media and collecting art depictions of Black death—is guilt.
The guilt that motivates Virginia to keep rejecting and looking and Charles buying
and selling Black death does not reside solely in their white bodies. Guilt establishes
the differentiation between white innocent collectivities and broken Black bodies.
This differentiation, not housed in any singular body, continues a differentiation that
is never over as Ahmed articulates about affective economies of hate. Guilt “awaits
others who have not yet arrived” such that a waiting for the broken is what justifies
the repetition of violence against Black bodies. Through an affective economy of
guilt, no single Black body can be registered as a human in suffering, but instead
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what registers is a collective brokenness that white saviors anticipate in order to
save. These violences, which Charles and Virginia inflict, are enacted in the name of
“protecting the nation” (47). While for the white supremacists that Ahmed analyzes,
“protecting the nation” means to preserve the nation’s identity of homogeneous
whiteness, for white liberal saviors such “protecting the nation” means to protect
the nation’s identity as innocent.

Fanon: The Failure of White Liberal Recognition
Rankine’s depiction of the consumption of Black death through art and social
media demonstrates another form of pornotroping. But even Black life that is
present in the play can only be considered another body. Charlotte, the sole Black
character of the play, articulates Black life in her voice, presence, and action as an
artist. Yet, even Charlotte’s voice and presence in the play can only be rendered as
object under the white gaze of Charles and Virginia. As an art patron, Charles
maintains a position of support for Black voices through the endowment of his
wealth to the arts. Charles denies how patronage still functions as a system of
property and ownership akin to slavery. However, the interactions between Charles
and Charlotte reveal such sentiment:

CHARLES:

All that white, smoky charcoal obscuring the faceless police?
I—

VIRGINIA:

(interrupting) I like it. It’s atmospheric and not so graphic.

CHARLOTTE:

That’s my point.
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ERIC:

If I remember correctly the painting is based on an actual
photograph.

CHARLES:

You know it is.

VIRGINIA:

Eric likes to pretend he doesn’t know all he knows. Isn’t that
right, Eric?

CHARLOTTE:

(playful) He’s the epitome of humility.

CHARLES:

He knows good work when he sees it. And so do I.

ERIC:

Charlotte, I think that’s meant for you.

VIRGINIA:

Yes, Charlotte, all eyes are on you.

CHARLOTTE:

My friends say such good things about working with you. Glenn
Ligon was so pleased we were finally connecting.

CHARLES:

Glenn, yes. We have a number of his pieces, but this one here is
from the Million Man March. It’s an early piece focusing on the
social and economic stresses that black men face.

VIRGINIA:

Come, let me show you this other piece. It’s called Defacement:
The Death of Michael…Michael Stewart, that’s right. He was a
Pratt student, graffiti artist, who was beaten into a coma by
police. This is about as real as I can handle it.

CHARLOTTE:

I’ve never seen this Basquiat. It takes my breath away/

VIRGINIA:

We just acquired it. It’s all Charles looks at.

CHARLOTTE:

There’s so much to see. I’ve read about your collection in
Artforum. So many artists here who have inspired me. I’m
really honored to be with you tonight.

VIRGINIA:

We’re delighted that you’re here as well. Charles takes his
stable of artists quite seriously. For him you’re not just an
investment, he believes you’re leading a conversation with the
culture.

Rankine, Claudia. The White Card. Minneapolis, Graywolf Press, 2019, pp. 22-3.
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Charles collapses Charlotte’s art with herself, which further collapses the
distinction between owning her art and owning her, a distinction that actually does
not exist in the U.S. nation-state. When attempting a compliment about Charlotte’s
work, Charles states, “[Eric, the art dealer] knows good work when he sees it and so
do I” (22). Their art dealer, Eric, immediately replies, “Charlotte, I think that’s meant
for you” (22). Eric claims that Charles’s remark refers directly to Charlotte rather
than Charlotte’s work, a significant subtlety. Charlotte’s body merges with the body
of her work into a plane of non-distinction. To further emphasize even more-so the
inadvertent objectification of Charlotte, and not just her art, as property, Virginia
attempts a compliment as well by stating, “Charles takes his stable of artists quite
seriously. For him you’re not just an investment, he believes you are leading the
conversation with culture” (23). Even if using a term like “leading” to describe
Charlotte’s artistic candor, Charlotte is still rendered as property and non-human, as
one artist within Charles’s “stable.” Charles and Virginia cannot recognize Charlotte
as a subject in their engagement with an analytic of nonrecognition.
The act of rendering Black bodies as object and white bodies as subject
harkens back to Fanon’s subject-object relations from Black Skins, White Masks. In
“The So-Called Dependency Complex of the Colonized,” Fanon discards the
hegemonic ontology of Blacks as inferior and dependent. Instead, Fanon maintains
that the psychological complexes of inferiority and dependency of Blacks are due to
the overarching colonial structure. Fanon argues, “Inferiorization is the native
correlative to the European feeling of superiority. Let us have the courage to say: It
is the racist who creates the inferiorized” (73). The overarching colonial structure
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relies on the reduction of Blacks to an Othered object. Blacks are not ontologically
inferior; however, the survival of a fragile white subjectivity depends upon this
analytic of non-recognition of Blacks. In order to maintain this assumption, the
legacy of white subjectivity constructs mechanisms, from psychological to systemic,
to materially reduce Blacks to objects to reflect this assumption. This reduction
provides whites the ability to derive their subject selfhood upon an encounter with
the Othered Black object. This legacy of colonial subject-object relations continues
to manifest into the present, even among those who wish to “help” Blacks such as
Charles and Virginia.
Though subject-object relations may readily be assessed in the dichotomies
of colonizer and colonized, slave-owner and slave, and police officer and Black body,
white abolitionists also perpetuate objectification of Black bodies that is equally as
harmful. These white abolitionists who work within the telos of “white innocence”
still maintain a European colonial sense of superiority as shown in the roles of art
patron and colorblind board member. Charles and Virginia’s white savior wish to
“help” Charlotte enacts as harmful an objectification of her Black body as outlined in
Fanon’s subject-object relations.
This analytic of nonrecognition functions as yet another harm against Black
bodies in the affective economy of white innocence. On how the affect of hate may
solidify the identity of others, Ahmed argues:
That is, hate crime works as a form of violence against groups through
violence against the bodies of individuals. Violence against others may be one
way in which the other's identity is fixed or sealed; the other is forced to
embody a particular identity by and for the perpetrator of the crime, and that
force involves harm or injury (55).
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Guilt functions similarly in performing crimes against a Black body perceived as
broken. The crimes, though not explicitly violent in nature, perform a kind of use of
the Black body as means to achieve white validation. In an affective economy of
white innocence, if one “saves” a Black body, or is seen as “saving” a Black body, it
seals one’s collective identity as part of white innocence; even if quietly or implicitly,
this “saving” maintains white social power over against Black bodies while also
protecting whiteness against guilt. The violence thus inflicted upon Black bodies is
to continually fix them as an object of redemption for white innocence, as evidenced
in Virginia and Charles’s continued endeavors at a “critical agency” to save Black
people. This salvation would thus be considered its own kind of guilt crime that
remains situated in an analytic of nonrecognition.

Ahmed: The Failure of the “Colorblind” White Liberal
Charles objectifies Black bodies not only through collapsing the ownership of
their artwork with the ownership of their bodies, but also through his attempt at
fulfilling diversity quotas on boards. In addition to collecting art, Charles serves on
the board for his foundation. He notes that Charlotte would be a good fit for his
board, stating, “I’m thinking she’d be good for the board. We have that hole there”
(44).
ERIC:

So how do you feel the evening is going?

CHARLES:

I like her. I like how measured she is. The new work could be
really groundbreaking.

ERIC:

I agree.
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CHARLES:

I want to do more than buy her work. I want to support her
endeavors.

ERIC:

She did say something about wanting a new studio.

CHARLES:

What do they run nowadays?

ERIC:

Depends. Brooklyn. Around a million.

CHARLES:

That’s not bad. I know someone I can call. I’m thinking she’d be
good for the board. We have that hole there.

ERIC:

It will definitely solve the diversity issue.

CHARLES:

It will be appropriate to explain the workings of the foundation
and the impact it’s having.

ERIC:

I’ll leave that to you. What do you have there?
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In Living a Feminist Life, Ahmed engages in diversity work as a way of
warping institutional norms. She warps these norms precisely in inhabiting spaces
of atmospheric whiteness with a raced body (135). Yet she is critical of diversity
work when it veers into a cop-out for larger systemic organizations to avoid the real
labor of wrestling with walls that uphold the atmospheric norms of whiteness. She
argues:
One time after I gave a talk on whiteness, a white man in the audience said,
‘But you’re a professor?’ You can hear the implication of this but: but look at
you, Professor Ahmed, look how far you have gone! How easily we can
become poster children for diversity, how easily we can be held up as proof
that women of color are not held up. Being a diversity poster child: it can
make the world you come up against recede as if you bring it to an end; as if
our arrival and progression makes whiteness disappear (146-147).
For Ahmed, “diversity poster child” performs the repeated role of tokenism within
institutional frameworks where the resolution of the legacy of systemic racism is
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resolved through the filling of a quota. Ironically, the “hole” of board, which Charles
considers “colorblind” is the presence of a diverse set of bodies in the room that
together engage in proprietary endeavors that are historically rooted in whiteness.
Eric affirms that the inclusion of Charlotte on the board “will definitely solve the
diversity issue” (45). Ahmed warns of the problems that prevent an exposure of
whiteness, namely when “your own body becomes used as evidence that the walls of
which you speak are not there or are no longer there; as if you have eliminated the
walls through your own progression” (147). When Charlotte asks if racism is really
just a byproduct of capitalism or if whites inherently believe themselves to be
superior, Charles argues, “In the boardroom decisions are always colorblind. We
don’t get distracted. If this administration’s base is solidly white men spewing racist
rhetoric, it’s not us” (49). Yet, the very vantage point of colorblindness is in essence
the crux of whiteness: to be in a position transcendent of any positionality. Charles’s
argument that anything in contrast to blatant white supremacy cannot enact
another form of racism prevents him from dismantling the wall around whiteness’s
colorblindness. Charles’s defensiveness may be summed up in the following claim
he declares after his son Alex points out the direness of addressing racism in the
U.S.: “I don’t support this idea that all white people are a part of what’s wrong with
this country. Some of us are working very hard to make all our lives better” (46).
Charles’s claim of colorblindness links to an undeclared history that Ahmed
articulates as a significant facet in the operation of affective economies. By
undeclared histories, Ahmed means allusions to other events in temporal proximity.
When addressing undeclared histories in “The Organisation of Hate,” Ahmed details
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how soon after a man named Tony Martin was sentenced to life imprisonment after
he killed a teenage boy who attempted a burglary of his home, a Conservative Party
leader named William Hague stated that the law is “more interested in the rights of
criminals than the rights of people who are burgled” (47). While not being explicit in
comparison, a sentence like this “evokes a history that is not declared” (47). As an
example of how meanings accumulate in affective economies, this undeclared
history “sticks” because “it positions Martin as the victim rather than the criminal,
as a person who was burgled, rather than a person who killed” (47). In contrast,
when Charles says that the white men spewing racist hate is “not us” and that “some
of us” are ensuring that “our lives are better” his rhetoric establishes an undeclared
history of white innocence in contrast to the historical moment of the Trump era.
Though Charles can acknowledge the Trump administration as the source of racist
hatred, his allusion to such hatred establishes a distinction for himself. This
undeclared history of white innocence sticks because white saviors can be seen as
innocent in contrast to Trump supporters. Because he is not a Trump supporter, any
action Charles commits such as collecting art voids him of any inquiry, and, should
even be celebrated for its critical agency in improving all lives.

Hartman: The Failure with White Liberal “Empathy”
I return to Charles’s grand reveal of his latest art purchase. During Charles’s
unveiling of the piece, a portrayal of Michael Brown’s body, he states, “That body is a
portal to the inhumanity” (57).
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ALEX:

It’s Brown’s autopsy.

CHARLOTTE:

But according to you, Charles, the only way to get to Officer
Wilson is through Michael Brown’s body?

CHARLES:

That body is a portal to the inhumanity.

CHARLOTTE:

(under her breath) We’re not going to get anywhere with this
kind of…this kind of American sentimentality.

CHARLES:

How is this sentimentality? This piece will remind everyone
who comes into this house what’s happening out there.

CHARLOTTE:

Feeling bad by looking at black lines enclosing a white space
doesn’t come close to experiencing the dread of knowing you
could be killed for simply being black.

ERIC:

Not to state the obvious, but we’re not black. And I think that is
what is important about your work. It gives the viewer a point
of entry.

CHARLOTTE:

But we’re not looking at my work. This generic public record is
just that, generic, impersonal. Don’t you understand people
were shot in the Bible study? Nine bodies bleeding to death on
a tile floor is the same as this?

ERIC:

Hold on, Charlotte. You are acting as if this is a personal assault
on you. It’s not as if you run the risk of being shot by police…

CHARLOTTE:

If you think I am protected from ending up like the Sandra
Blands of the world—the black woman who purportedly
hanged herself…

VIRGINIA:

We know who Sandra Bland is…

ERIC:

I would have thought this piece is exactly the intent of your
work, to make people feel with their eyes the violence done to
African Americans.

CHARLES:

I agree with Eric, this representation is no different from your
work.

CHARLOTTE:

Any police report of my death would erase me as much as this
autopsy report erases Michael Brown.
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CHARLES:

I can’t see this (gestures toward the sculpture) without thinking
of Michael Brown. It’s a memorial to him in our home.

ALEX:

It’s art in our house.

CHARLES:

I know you’re always saying the other pieces I collect
aestheticize black experience, but you can’t say that about this.

CHARLOTTE:

If you think what I’m doing is no different than this then I fail.
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For Charles, Mike Brown, in all his spliced and remolded creation, can never
be human, but merely the object through which whites may use to represent
inhumanity. Charlotte labels Charles “sentimental” in his decision to purchase a
piece of artwork that displays the autopsy report of Michael Brown.
In Saidiya Hartman’s Scenes of Subjection, Hartman outlines the precarious
effects of empathy, which Charles and Virginia emulate during their dinner.
Hartman addresses specifically how empathy deployed on the part of white
abolitionists further illuminates and structures the Black body as object. In a
sentimental gesture, white abolitionist John Rankin writes to his brother in
brutalizing detail about how slaves have been treated in order to convey the evils of
the slavery system:
We are naturally too callous to the sufferings of others, and consequently
prone to look upon them with cold indifference, until, in imagination we
identify ourselves with the suffers, and make their sufferings our own…When
I bring it near, inspect it closely, and find that it is inflicted on men and
women, who possess the same nature and feelings with myself, my
sensibility is roused (18).
Rankin attempts to evoke empathy in his brother by imagining how he would feel if
he had been subject to such brutality. Though the intention may ultimately be for
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abolitionist ends, Hartman demonstrates how such attempts at empathy only
further reify the Black body as an object outside of humanity’s recognition. The
exercise of empathy can only allow for a white subject to again feel for himself, as
Hartman argues, “Yet empathy in important respects confounds Rankin’s efforts to
identify with the enslaved because in making the slave’s suffering his own, Rankin
begins to feel for himself rather than for those whom this exercise in imagination
presumably is designed to reach” (19). In Rankine’s play, Hartman’s argument of
empathy fails to contribute to the subjectification of Black bodies and only further
solidifies Black bodies as a fungible object.
Charles’s sentimental gesture to portray Black death mirrors Rankin’s
sentimental gestures to portray Black death. In both cases, the fungibility of the
Black body is revealed through such empathic gestures as Hartman writes:
Moreover, by exploiting the vulnerability of the captive body as a vessel for
the uses, thoughts, and feelings of others, the humanity extended to the slave
inadvertently confirms the expectations and desires definitive of the
relations of chattel slavery. In other words, the ease of Rankin’s empathic
identification is as much due to his good intentions and heartfelt opposition
to slavery as to the fungibility of the captive body (19).
However, whereas Rankin attempts to portray this pain as a way to achieve
identification whereas Charles collapses lived Black fleshly pain with objectified
Black bodies in an attempt to disrupt the social discourses written on Black bodies.
In response to Charles’s claim of the art depicting Black death as a portal to
inhumanity, Charlotte states, “Feeling bad by looking at Black lines enclosing a white
space doesn’t come close to experiencing the dread of knowing you could be killed
for simply being Black” (58). Charlotte points out that a gap still remains between
Black suffering and Charles’s feeble attempts at understanding or sympathizing or
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even identifying with Black suffering through art or empathy. Instead of disrupting
any of the discourses already branded on the Black body, Charles’s art piece only
reproduces these discourses once more through his violence of identification.
Both sympathy and empathy for Black suffering operate within the affective
economy of white innocence. To position bodies as objects to be sympathized with
or empathized with still reifies the suffering of said bodies. Hartman writes,
There is a relation between destructive attachments and conservation: for
the destructive relation to the object to be maintained the object itself must
be conserved in some form. So hate transforms this or that other into an
object whose expulsion or incorporation is needed, an expulsion or
incorporation that requires the conservation of the object itself in order to be
sustained (51).
An affective economy of either hate or innocence requires the conservation of the
object so that it may be expelled repeatedly. In the case of the affective economy of
white innocence, subsequent attempts of “relating” to Blackness or Black bodies
through either sympathy or empathy depends upon the conservation of the object,
the suffering Black body, in order to maintain feelings of sympathy or empathy.
When Charlotte deems Charles’s gesture “sentimental,” Charles questions the
accusation and defends himself by stating, “This piece will remind everyone who
comes into this house what is going on out there” (58). Nevertheless, Charles’s piece
is in fact far removed from any lived pain of Black flesh. The distance rendered
through art packages “reality” as sentimental, and the aroused feelings of sympathy
or empathy remain tethered in association to a status of white innocence. In reality,
however, sympathy and empathy do not vanquish the harmful discourses written on
Spillers’s Black body but merely accumulates even more discourses through the
affective economy of white innocence. Charles’s art piece actually accumulates more
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harmful discourses about Black flesh through another production of the Black body
as broken and in need of saving through white critical agency.

The Failure of White Liberal “Wokeness”
While Charles and Virginia engage in the affective economy of white
innocence through white saviordom, their son, Alex, also engages in the affective
economy of white innocence through his own positionality as “woke.” Whereas
Charles and Virginia deny their own shame through a critical agency of “helping”
Blacks, Alex denies his own shame through his merciless judgment of his own
parents as white saviors. Alex’s supposed “wokeness” functions as yet another
defense mechanism, another form of white innocence, because he implies he has
transcended into the ideal white anti-racist subjectivity through his own
enlightenment about race and vocal judgments of his mother, in particular, as
ignorant.
Alex, alluding to the dialogue around white saviordom, tries to “correct” his
mother after she says Alex is a “superhero” (34). He responds, “Mom, I try to engage
with you, nonjudgmentally, but you’re making it impossible. This isn’t about me.
We’ve talked about this before” (34). “This” refers to Alex’s antiracism involvement
in racial justice movements like Black Lives Matter. Alex’s lack of forgiveness and
judgment of his mother prevents him from owning his own self-loathing for his own
whiteness. By focusing his anger on his parents, he can also remain “innocent” as a
white person by considering his parents, the white liberal saviors, as the real
problem. In the case of Alex’s relationship with his mother in particular, he exhibits
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some aspects later readings of the Oedipal complex consider as an individuation
process where in that his antagonism toward his mother persists in a conflict over
psychological separation from her.22 In Alex’s case, he further elaborates on his
disdain for his parents by stating, “Innocent people of color are every place, even if
you’re trying not to look” (36). Alex is aware of the conversations about black
invisibility to a white gaze, but maintains a critical agency through accusing his
mother as the root of the problem. There is no humility in how Alex handles the
recognition of making a mistake as unremitting in the project of racial justice.
Alex considers his sense of wokeness to derive not only from separating
himself from his parents, but also from establishing his fluency on antiracism work.
He reads Robin DiAngelo’s White Fragility and claims that he should give a copy to
his mother (51). Alex’s wokeness lacks any recognition of the inevitable tragedy in
racial justice work. Instead, Alex operates in an affective economy of white
innocence where his judgment of his parents and knowledgeability on race solidifies
for him his identity as woke. Alex’s position as “woke” really just does what a
student leader from a Black Lives Matter leader suggests: “make [him] feel better
and help [him] sleep at night” (39). Charlotte notes how Alex is being hard on his
mother after he accuses his mother of having “white tears” (51). In a way, Alex uses
the black movement to not deal with his own personal affects toward his family.

Freud’s Oedipal complex maintains that adult neurosis derives from the core childhood neurosis.
That childhood neurosis, for men, manifests as a fear of the father and (sexual) desire for the mother,
which typically resolves in childhood in order to prevent adult neurosis. Mahler reads Freud’s
Oedipal complex as less about how to reject the mother as a sexual object, but how to establish
individuality through separation.
Joel Paris, “The Oedipus Complex: A Critical Re-Examination,” (Canadian Psychiatric Association
Journal, vol. 21, no. 3, 1976) 173-179.
22

50
Alex uses and co-opts the black cause to avoid accepting his own parents’ inabilities
to hear or see him; as long as he does this, he will not actually be able to hear
Charlotte and respect what she does or what she needs.
Actions such as viewing and collecting art that depict Black death, diversity
and inclusion initiatives, and identifying with Black suffering are an effect of the
affective economy of white innocence. All the behaviors as exhibited by Charles and
Virginia highlight how guilt circulates affectively to separate particular bodies into
solidified identity groups and inflicts further harms onto certain bodies (i.e., Black
bodies) for the sake of validating other bodies (i.e., white bodies). Part of the
problem with Charles and Virginia is their inability to access any feelings of
discomfort, discomfort around their complicity in racism. In order to assuage its
guilt, the affective economy of white innocence expels discomfort in exchange for a
critical agency to assuage its guilt. In reality, any one’s remote discomfort or shame
can only be perceived as a threat to one’s own form of white innocence. Much of the
Chapter 3 will delve in the generativity of shame and vulnerability as a disruption to
the affective economy of white innocence.
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CHAPTER 3: SHAME
I return to the affects listed in Chapter 1: disavowal, innocence, triumphant
agency, and guilt. These affects form the affective economy of white innocence. The
problem with this affective economy lies in its inability to access emotions that
challenge white innocence or white liberal subjectivity. Instead, as indicated in
Chapter 2’s engagement with The White Card, it is precisely this circulating affective
economy of white innocence that produces the white saviordom or “wokeness” of
Charles, Virginia, and Alex. Moreover, this circulation of affects simultaneously
accumulates more violent discourse and violent actions onto Black bodies. As
Ahmed argues, a stuckness exists in such a circulation and pervasiveness of
whiteness that must be named and critiqued. After critiquing whiteness in Chapter 1
and 2, what can emerge? Both George Yancy’s “Dear White America” and James
Cones’s God of the Oppressed consider how shame may offer access to an otherwise,
an otherwise that extends beyond the stuckness of the affective economy of white
innocence. For Yancy this otherwise requires “tarrying” while Cone explores “a
death to whiteness.” Both Yancy and Cone provide an analytic of shame for
considering the opportunities that reside within hopelessness in the concluding
scene of The White Card.
In “Dear White America,” Yancy articulates how “tarrying” can be a way of
accessing shame.23 Yancy defines “tarrying” in its distinction from “wallowing”:
I can see your anger. I can see that this letter is being misunderstood. This
letter is not asking you to feel bad about yourself, to wallow in guilt. That is
23

George Yancy. “Dear White America: Letter to a New Minority.” New York Times, 24 December
2015.
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too easy. I’m asking for you to tarry, to linger, with the ways in which you
perpetuate a racist society, the ways in which you are racist.
While guilt collapses the white gaze repeatedly onto itself in the form of
“wallowing,” “tarrying” may serve as the extended stay in places of residual shame.
In many ways, “wallowing” serves as a strategy to avoid acknowledging racist
culpability, of doubling down on white innocence. Shame, on the other hand, may
access this acknowledgment. This residual shame accrues from the unacknowledged
perpetuation of systemic racism. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, an affective
economy of white innocence feeds off of a lack of acknowledgment. Shame—as
Yancy demonstrates through “tarrying”—provides an access to a phenomenological
position of otherwise, an otherwise to the pervasive affective economy of white
innocence. Such a “tarrying” provides a space, as Yancy considers, to “trace the binds
that tie you to forms of domination that you would rather not see.” Guilt or
“wallowing” on the other hand, simply centers whiteness by placing white liberal
subjects as the sole enactor of racism. Shame, on the other hand, reveals the
systemic mechanisms and interweaved affects that move and orient white liberal
subjects to enact harms on Black bodies. So long as guilt circulates, there cannot be
acknowledgement or perception to even begin the process of tracing back to such
violent discourses branded onto Black bodies in the U.S.
For Virginia, her guilt manifests as a “wallowing” that Yancy cautions against
in the excerpt above (“This letter is not asking you to feel bad about yourself, to
wallow in guilt”). When Charlotte claims that the goal of her art is to unveil what has
not been seen, she says, “I do want people to feel what Black people are feeling”
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(28). Even beyond seeing, Charlotte wants a momentary affect: an experience of
being a Black body in the U.S. Because Virginia is incapable of tolerating the shame
of Black suffering, she wallows in her own self-pity produced from guilt. She asks in
a voice that Rankine notes to be “genuinely feeling,” “What kinds of feelings am I not
feeling?” (28). Rather than sit with shame, Virginia slips into the guilt of “feeling bad
for oneself,” which can only further center whiteness and possibly demand more
emotional labor from Charlotte to assuage her guilt. If Virginia sat with her shame,
she would engage in more affective work of “tracing” her own binds to the forms of
domination. In this case, “tarrying” asks for a temporal lingering with discomfort in
order to resist placing additional responsibility for dismantling racism and
emotional labor onto Charlotte.
In a similar vein as Yancy, James Cone also advocates that white liberal
subjects accept their participation in such violent discourses. While Yancy claims
that such acceptance necessitates the affect of shame through “tarrying,” Cone
argues for a theological white death. I turn to theology, and specifically Cone’s
theology, as an analytical lens for considering how a white death is not synonymous
with a subjective collapse, but rather a precursive event to entering an otherwise.
Cone crafts a theology in God of the Oppressed that attends to black life, suffering,
and liberation.24 His theology emphasizes the workings of the divine as grounded in
historical, social, and material contexts. This theology differs from much Greekinfluenced Christian thought where questions and conclusions about God stemmed
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Cones, James H. God of the Oppressed. Maryknoll, Orbis Press, 1997.
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from assumptions about God’s contextlessness and timelessness. Cone applies this
contextualization of theology when considering the theological concept of
reconciliation. When addressing reconciliation, Cone contextualizes the theological
concept of reconciliation through examining the historical and social desire for
reconciliation between blacks and whites in the U.S. On such a reconciliation, Cone
notes:
White people must realize that reconciliation is a costly experience. It is not
holding hands and singing ‘Black and white together’ and ‘We shall
overcome.’ Reconciliation means death, and only those who are prepared to
die in the struggle for freedom will experience new life with God (219).
I argue that Cones’s notions of reconciliation such as “holding hands and singing”
sentiments like “Black and white together” or “We shall overcome” remain tethered
to the affective economy of white innocence. These “sentiments” demand an erasure
of the past without dismantling current systems of white power legacies. Such
“sentiments” remain out of touch with the type of shame Yancy outlines because it
lacks “tarrying” in the discomfort of the binds that still tie white people to legacies of
racial oppression. Instead, Cone turns to death as a prerequisite of white-black
reconciliation.
But how exactly is death connected to reconciliation between blacks and
whites? For Cone, when a white person “dies,” it means that a person “sells and
redefines his or her life in commitment to the Kingdom of God” in the name of
repentance for engaging in or profiting by Black oppression (221). Cone’s
theological reading of the Kingdom of God is the realm for those who have been
designated as destitute in the world. He maintains, “God’s kingdom is for the bad
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characters, the outcasts, and the weak, but not for the self-designated righteous
people” (73). For white liberal subjects who have designated themselves as
righteous, like Charles or Virginia, the Kingdom of God remains a realm outside their
own access. Furthermore, to “commit” to the Kingdom of God requires a dedication
to redefining one’s life for those who have been deemed “bad characters” or
“outcasts” such as Black people. But one cannot begin this process of commitment
without recognizing how a position of self-righteousness as a white liberal subject
contributed to racial oppression. It is only when white liberal subjects repent for
such contributions that whites and blacks may reconcile in the pursuit of social
justice. Cone argues:
When whites undergo the true experience of conversion wherein they die to
whiteness and are reborn anew in order to struggle against white oppression
and for the liberation of the oppressed, there is a place for them in the black
struggle for freedom (222).
I apply Cone’s concept of “death to whiteness” to the affective death of the white
liberal subject. White liberal subjectivity operates within an affective economy of
white innocence, in part, through claiming that white liberal subjects are in fact
fighting against white oppression of the oppressed. However, they have not
committed the white death that may bring them truly into the Black struggle for
freedom. This is in part due to their allegiance to the “sentimental” like Cone
outlines as well as Charlotte in The White Card. Cone notes that fighting for the
oppressed, or white conversion to the black cause, “ought not be identified with
white sympathy for blacks or with a pious feeling in white folks’ hearts” (221).
Without white death, one remains a white liberal subject, tethered to sentimental
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affects like “sympathy” and “piety.” Similarly, as explored in the previous chapter,
Charlotte calls out Charles’s art collecting as an exhibit of “American sentimentality”
(57). When Charles claims that the display of Michael Brown’s autopsy is “a portal to
the inhumanity,” Charlotte maintains, “Feeling bad by looking at Black lines
enclosing a white space doesn’t come close to experiencing the dread of knowing
you could be killed for simply being Black” (58). In both examples, Cone and
Charlotte illuminate how white liberal subjects remain stuck in their attachment to
sentimental affects such as sympathy. Sympathy, in addition to affects like guilt and
triumphant agency, comprise the affective economy of white innocence.
As a white liberal subject, one partakes in the affective economy of white
innocence that perpetuates and accumulates racist harms. As Cone notes, whites
who “convert” to the movement of racial justice “must be made to realize that they
are like babies who have barely learned how to walk and talk” (222). A “white
convert” is child-like not in innocence, but in ignorance. Therefore, a “white convert”
requires molding and guidance as it continues its unremitting failures in the process
of learning just a little more of how to “walk and talk” against white oppression and
for the liberation of the oppressed. This “white convert” differs from the white
liberal subjectivity precisely in the white convert’s submission to being incapable
and unknowledgeable about how to single-handedly resolve racism while also
acknowledging how, even in their best efforts at racial justice, they may in fact be
regularly perpetuating racism.
Cone’s definition of a “white convert” to Black liberation connects back to
unremitting failure. As outlined back in Chapter 1, by focusing on and
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acknowledging Ahmed’s claim of “stuckness” in white backdrops, white people may
better attend to the oppressions they contribute to or perpetuate in the present.
This present is saturated in tragedy due to overarching white hegemonies as
outlined by Glaude. Through the acknowledgement that failure is an inevitability in
any gesture toward racial justice amidst the tragic backdrop of white hegemonies,
white people may be more apt to learn from their ignorance rather than maintain a
stance of eternal innocence.
In the case of Charles at the start of the play, his own identity with white
liberal subjectivity inhibits Cones’s “death to whiteness.” His white innocence
upholds a wall of defensiveness when it is challenged, as he states, “I don’t support
this idea that all white people are a part of what’s wrong in this country” (46). In his
white innocence, Charles maintains that his opposition to Trump protects him from
committing harm, therefore he does not need to labor over the power of his
language. This lack of labor on Charles’s part leads to lackadaisical usage of “rally
for” and “protest of” Trump when referring to his son’s political activism (24; 31).
Ultimately, Charles positions himself as an ideal antiracist subjectivity of white
innocence, which allows him to claim he is a beacon of safety. He states, “My dear,
don’t worry, you are safe here” (24). Charles’s white innocence convinces him that
harm is not something he is capable of due to his opposition to Trump, and
therefore he does not have to consider the harmful impact of his own microaggressions of language or practice. These actions are twofold: solidifying the
identities of white innocence and broken Black bodies as well as accumulate more
harmful discourses onto Black flesh in the form of Black bodies. These earlier
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encounters with Charles in the play demonstrate how he has yet to “die to
whiteness” because his own white liberal subjectivity remains alive, agential, and,
ultimately, innocent.
At the closing of The White Card, I consider how Rankine demonstrates an
example of white death as accessed through shame. A year after the dinner party
ordeal, Charles visits Charlotte’s studio to inquire about her latest art exhibit.
Charles asks Charlotte why her art now consists of images of white people observing
Black suffering rather than simply images of Black suffering. In response, Charlotte
claims that the art she used to create contributed to the collective reification of
Black death rather than the critique of such reification. An example of this collective
reification occurs with the aesthetic depictions of Michael Brown’s death, which
further memorialized Black flesh into broken Black bodies and further erased the
white police officer involved in the facilitation of such death. Charles grows
defensive when Charlotte hints that Charles and the white police officer work within
the same white imaginary. She states:
Look, I don’t want you to think of the officer as a monster or Hulk Hogan or a
demon or whatever and I don’t think you’re a monster, but his obsession
with black people as criminals and yours with black people as victims are cut
from the same cloth. Neither is human (77).
In this way, Charlotte highlights how the white liberal subjectivity, as it operates
within an affective economy of white innocence, harms Blacks equally as much as
white supremacists. Framing a Black body as victim continues to distinguish it from
the category of man. Charlotte’s comment about being cut from the “same cloth”
primes him for the possibility to experience his shame. However, it is not until the
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final section where Charlotte challenges Charles to confront his whiteness not only
in conversation but also through becoming an art piece that he experiences a white
death:
CHARLOTTE:

What do you see when you look at me?

CHARLES:

The daylight.

CHARLOTTE:

What does that even mean?

CHARLES:

You of all people should understand that. You and I are out in
the world and it’s as if there’s a fault line that runs the entirety
of our lives between us. On your terms there’s no way for me to
get to you on the other side.

CHARLOTTE:

If that were only true. Despite all the segregation, the tragedy
is we are on the same side. We’ve always been here together,
shipwrecked here together.

CHARLES:

You’re right; we’re here together.

CHARLOTTE:

Wrecked together, solitary, here together…

CHARLES:

But the feeling is the feeling of a gap.

CHARLOTTE:

The gap, Charles, is caused because you refuse the role you
actually play.

CHARLES:

I don’t need you to show me me.

CHARLOTTE:

Me, me, me. You don’t need me to show you anything. That’s
probably the first honest thing you’ve said.

CHARLES:

Fuck you, Charlotte.

CHARLOTTE:

I’m already fucked. You know, I have to admit, I thought you
were different from all the others, but in the end…for you I’m
just this annoyance that won’t confirm to your good works.

CHARLES:

You’re acting as if I think of you as some kind of project.

CHARLOTTE:

Well, don’t you?
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CHARLES:

I do believe I can help.

CHARLOTTE:

If you actually want to help, why don’t you make you your
project?

CHARLES:

What about me? My money? My power? My mobility, as you
say?

CHARLOTTE:

I mean the mass murder and devastation that comes with you
being you.

CHARLES:

Me being me? Mass murder, devastation. It’s hard not to hear
that as a completely irritational attack.

CHARLOTTE:

Racism exists outside of reason. Black people have never been
human.

CHARLES:

This is so hopeless.

CHARLOTTE:

Go further into that hopelessness, and then we can begin to
really see each other.

CHARLES:

You’re right to keep me a part of it. My whiteness. It needs to
be faced.

CHARLOTTE:

(she faces Charles) At its’ deepest level, yes.

CHARLES:

It’s just skin and yet I know it’s power too.

CHARLOTTE:

Dehumanizing power.

CHARLES:

What is skin? I’ve heard dust is mostly skin (touching the
table)—is this my skin? Yours?

CHARLOTTE:

Charles—

CHARLES:

We’re shedding skin all the time—thousands of cells a minute.
But it renews itself. I’ve never actually looked at my skin.
How many cells is it? How porous is it? How many layers are
there? Where is it darkest? Where lightest? (He began to
unbutton his shirt.) All my skin is holding me together. Good
lord, all this skin shields me. It protects me from…from being
you.
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It’s like the badge of the police. (He removes his shirt and turns
his back to her.) I’m ready. (Beat.)
Charlotte, you can shoot me now. (He stands there with his back
to her and arms at his side. Silence.)
(Leonard Cohen’s “Different Sides” begins to play. Charlotte ties
her smock around her waist and, taking off her shoes, steps onto
a crate, binding her hands with his scarf. She stares at Charles’s
back. Charles turns around. His horror and confusion are
apparent. There is the click and flash of a camera.)
Rankine, Claudia. The White Card. Minneapolis, Graywolf Press, 2019, pp. 86-9.

Charlotte manages to capture what Ahmed calls the “waiting for the bogus”—
which accumulates again and again in the affective economy of white innocence—
while placing Charles as the real art project, the real object to depict. I return again
to Ahmed’s discourse of “waiting for the bogus” as an integral dimension of affective
economies. On “waiting for the bogus,” Ahmed writes:
The impossibility of reducing hate to a particular body allows hate to
circulate in an economic sense, working to differentiate some others from
other others, a differentiation that is never 'over', as it awaits others who
have not yet arrived. Such a discourse of 'waiting for the bogus' is what
justifies the repetition of violence against the bodies of others in the name of
protecting the nation (47).
I applied Ahmed’s “waiting for the bogus” in affective economies of white hate to
affective economies of white innocence. I applied this by considering how white
liberal subjects repeatedly wait for the broken Black body that threatens their
identity as innocent white subjects of an innocent white nation. Such repeated
anticipations justify the violences of “helping” again and again in the name of white
guilt. While guilt on the part of the white subject usurps black bodies into a white
imagination, white shame as facilitated by Charlotte produces a potential exit out of
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this white innocence. Through a death of his white innocence, Charles glimpses at,
for possibly one of the first times, all the harms his white liberal subjectivity does to
Black bodies in this tragic backdrop. Now Charles sees the hopelessness of being
“shipwrecked” here together (86). Rankine’s reference to being “shipwrecked” (and
earlier Charlotte’s imagining her own artwork as being “held in the hold of a ship”
[76]) speaks to a larger analytical tradition in Black thought. This tradition
considers the hold of the slave ship as a site of both existence as an oppressed Black
body and non-existence as Black flesh as explored in Hortense Spillers and taken up
by Christina Sharpe in “wake work.”
Now Charles tarries in the discomfort that he too had been a part of: the
violence inflicted upon Black bodies. The real portal into the inhumanity is his own
body. Through Charles’s own shame, he may access a “white death” from the white
liberal subjectivity and consider an otherwise outside the affective economy of
white innocence. As Charles states, he has never actually looked at his skin until now
(88). Charlotte gives him a knowledge that reveals just how ignorant he had been all
along. In this way, his child-like white innocence is broken in order to see that it was
his own child-like white ignorance all along. This hopelessness, with Charles on
display as the object of analysis, provides a moment that gets Charles closer to a
recognition of Charlotte more so than could any pornotroping, art collecting that
depicts Black death, boardroom colorblindness, or empathy ever could. For a
moment, Charles glimpses into what it is like to be the object of the genre of white
man’s gaze, the gaze of whiteness.
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